INTERNATIONAL FOOD
POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
sustainable solutions for ending hunger and poverty

Supported by the CGIAR

IFPRI Discussion Paper 00909

October 2009

Food and Nutrition Emergencies in East Africa

Political, Economic and Environmental Associations

Ruth Oniang'o

Director General's Office

INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) was established in 1975. IFPRI is one of 15 agricultural research centers that receive principal funding from governments, private foundations, and international and regional organizations, most of which are members of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR).

FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTORS AND PARTNERS

IFPRI's research, capacity strengthening, and communications work is made possible by its financial contributors and partners. IFPRI gratefully acknowledges generous unrestricted funding from Australia, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the World Bank.

AUTHORS

Ruth Oniang'o, Rural Outreach Program (ROP)
Founder,
Editor-in-Chief, African Journal of Food, Agriculture, Nutrition and Development (AJFAND)
Email: oniango@iconnect.co.ke

Notices

[1] Effective January 2007, the Discussion Paper series within each division and the Director General's Office of IFPRI were merged into one IFPRI–wide Discussion Paper series. The new series begins with number 00689, reflecting the prior publication of 688 discussion papers within the dispersed series. The earlier series are available on IFPRI's website at http://www.ifpri.org/category/publication-type/discussion-papers.

[2] IFPRI Discussion Papers contain preliminary material and research results. They have not been subject to formal external reviews managed by IFPRI's Publications Review Committee but have been reviewed by at least one internal and/or external reviewer. They are circulated in order to stimulate discussion and critical comment.

CONTENTS

FIGURES

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I thank Joachim Von Braun and Rajul Pandya-Lorch for their invaluable suggestions. I also wish to thank Mohamed Sessay of UNEP/GEF Nairobi for his insights and suggestions and Michael Okumu my technical assistant for helping to manage the communication and formatting of the document.

ABSTRACT

Conflicts have existed for generations worldwide. In sub-Saharan Africa, conflicts occur for various reasons, including inter-tribal or clanist tensions, resource disputes, and externally instigated wars. These conflicts may persist unabated for generations, and can take on different dimensions. When a major conflict breaks out in one country, refugees often move in search of security and basic services (including food), creating major spill-overs that affect the entire region, placing considerable strain on local capacities to manage the food and nutrition needs of local populations and refugees. A sizeable proportion of the land making up sub-Saharan Africa is arid or semi-arid, rendering it unable to sustain livelihoods in any meaningful manner. Furthermore, this region often suffers from political turmoil and poor governance practices. This paper focuses on East Africa, a region that suffers from political, economic and environmental fragility. Few previous papers have examined the detrimental interactions between conflict and economic policy (as represented by reduced resources and limited organizational capacity for public services) in Sub-Saharan Africa nor have many studies examined the traditional coping strategies that sub-Saharan communities may use to resolve conflict. This paper attempts to describe the underlying reasons for the repeated hunger crises on the African continent, particularly in East Africa, followed by a brief analysis of additional factors that may exacerbate such emergencies. One key question is: What can be done to prevent these types of situations, and why haven't we found a lasting solution? It seems that these problems and their lack of management are largely due to policy failures and lack of political will. In regions of the world that experience earthquakes, hurricanes and typhoons (Africa does not), help may be obtained from outside the country, but the national governments themselves oversee the reconstruction and recovery aspects. In East Africa, in contrast, external assistance is required not only for the immediate disaster response, but also for subsequent development and reconstruction. Why don't governments in this region prepare for these nearly annual events? Furthermore, given that this is an insecure region, why don't the governments enact measures aimed at maintaining peace and security, which are necessary for effective development? One means to ensure peace and security in this troubled region is through strategies aimed at enhancing food productivity and access. Furthermore, good governance based on democratic representation of all citizens is key to preventing poverty, hunger, malnutrition, disease and conflict, leading to the attainment of harmony and balance in society.

Keywords: Food, nutrition, food emergencies, East Africa, food security, hunger, malnutrition, disease

1. INTRODUCTION

With high food prices threatening the food security of millions of vulnerable households around the world, hunger and malnutrition are back in the headlines. The world is making only slow progress in reducing food insecurity, according to the Global Hunger Index (GHI). Some regions—in particular South and Southeast Asia, the Near East and North Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean—have made significant headway in combating hunger and malnutrition since 1990, but in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, the GHI remains high. Moreover, progress in Sub-Saharan Africa since 1990 has been marginal (von Grebmer et al. 2008).

The focus of this paper is East Africa, which falls within the Greater Horn of Africa, an area that is known for its political insecurity, refugee movement, food scarcity and illegal commerce of small arms and weapons. The East African Community (EAC) is an intergovernmental organization comprising the five East African countries of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. The EAC was originally founded in 1967, collapsed in 1977 (giving rise to celebration in Kenya), and was officially revived on 7 July 2000. In 2008, the EAC, after negotiations with the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), agreed to an expanded free trade area that includes the member states of all three organizations. The combined population of East Africa is 126.2 million, meaning that these expanded trade opportunities should help enhance potential outcomes in East Africa (http://www.eac.int/)EAC Website accessed September 2009).

Figure 1. Map of Africa showing the Eastern African countries

Source: http://www.computers4africa.org/impact/eastafrica.htm

Figure 2. The highest estimated severity of food insecurity in Africa.



FEWS NET
Food Insecurity Severity Scale
Generally food secure
Moderately food insecure
Highly food insecure
Extremely food insecure
Famine

Source: FEWS NET June 2009
Note: Based on the latest assessment and monitoring data, as well as baseline data and analysis

This paper is based in part on information surrounding the skirmishes that followed a flawed December 2007 general election process in Kenya (UNICEF 2008, KCHR 2008). This was a clearly man-made emergency that was largely unexpected. Within a week of the first violent outbreak the conflict was already being described as a Rwanda-like situation, referring to the 1994 Rwandan civil war that resulted in the slaughter of nearly one million people. This was not the first such violence in Kenya, and other East African countries (e.g., *Uganda* and Burundi) have had their own crises in recent years. The post-election skirmishes, however, were distinguished by their timing, scale and the fact that international mediation was required. The questions that we examine against this backdrop of man-made crisis are: When will sub-Saharan Africa be food secure? What unsettles food security Africa? What are the experiences in East Africa?

2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Conflicts have existed worldwide for generations and persist through the present day, with some known trouble spots rarely experiencing peace for any length of time. This paper concentrates on conflicts and their possible association with food/ nutrition emergencies in Africa, with a particular focus on East Africa. In this region, conflicts may occur for a variety of reasons, ranging from inter-tribal resource competition to externally instigated wars.

The three East African countries of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania came together in 1971 to form the East African Community as an economic block with headquarters in Arusha, Tanzania while Rwanda and Burundi joined them later. East Africa lies in the Greater Horn of Africa, which is considered a conflict hot spot; once a major conflict breaks out in one country of the region, there is a major spill-over to the rest of the region. This affects basic services and has human-rights implications for both settled and refugee populations. Because of the region's vulnerability to conflict, there seems to be continuous movement of people from country to country in search of physical security, food, water, and grazing pastures. This type of movement puts considerable strain on a region that is already environmentally, economically and demographically unstable. Numerous reports examining the political and economic factors that appear to spark conflict have concluded that governance in sub-Saharan Africa in general (and East Africa in particular) must be improved in order to realize any meaningful development in the region especially from agriculture (Urbach and Sacks 2009, Sacks 2009). As environmental awareness has increased in recent years, it has become clear that we must also address the consequences of conflict on Africa's increasingly fragile environment, which is a critical component of the region's food production and distribution systems, as well as local human capacities. Literature has examined the unsettling events in East Africa and surrounding areas that culminate in hunger, itinerancy and various forms of human suffering (FEWS NET 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009). The world press is quick to show us pictures of starving children and emaciated adults huddling in camps or moving to safety. However, few reports have empirically examined the consequences of the detrimental interactions between conflict and economic policy, represented by reduced resources, a deteriorating environment and limited organizational capacity for public services (DFID 2005).

Beginning in the mid 1980's, food insecurity and hunger in sub-Saharan Africa was recognized as a cyclical issue that could be predicted as coming approximately every five years, particularly in East Africa. In addition, the region contains arid and semi-arid areas, some of which can go for as long as four years without a drop of rain. Historically, food insecurity and hunger have gone hand in hand with conflict, to the extent that it is difficult to determine the cause-effect relationship of the two with any degree of certainty. Does perpetual hunger and harsh environmental conditions drive people to violence or does unabated conflict lead to limited food production and activities that threaten the environment, or are both scenarios in play? Moreover, to what extent does bad governance and feelings of neglect drive populations to acts of war and resentment against their political leaders, thus causing people to move away from productive activities? Furthermore, although the concept of "climate change" is fairly recent, the effects of climate change have affected populations in East Africa for generations, with devastating impacts seen in the arid and semi-arid areas.

In East Africa, conflicts are often associated with politics and leadership issues, as seen in the early kingdom wars of Uganda, the political upheavals in Uganda (during the Amin days), Kenya (during the Mau Mau fights for independence in the 1950's) and Tanzania (against the Germans for independence), and the more recent conflicts between the Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi. Much more recently, there has been post-election violence in Kenya and civil strife in neighboring Sudan, Somali and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The negative effects of these conflicts have spilled over into other parts of the region in the form of refugees and the supply of illegal arms to local (Twaddle and Currey1993). Furthermore, terrorist attacks occurred in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and in neighboring Somalia on June 18, 2009. All these unsettling events affect people's livelihoods through insufficient

food production, increased morbidity and mortality, limited wealth creation, and decreased contribution to national development. These emerging issues cannot be addressed in a policy vacuum, or in an environment where many citizens feel neglected by the government and are not assured of basic services (e.g., justice). In these cases, individuals may worry more about their survival "today" than that during a "tomorrow" they are not assured of seeing. Thus, we must seek to improve governance and encourage policy makers to address the population's current needs, plan unselfishly for future generations, and work for the greater good.

Food insecurity in East Africa seems to have a multi-pronged causality. Political instability, wars and internal conflict constitute one set of problems. The uncertain climate and fragile ecology, which make it difficult to house and feed refugees and internally displaced persons present another set of challenges. Additional challenges emerge as situations worsen (Ulrich 2006, UNSa 2008). Here, we attempt to shed light on the interconnections among the various causal factors.

Food emergencies continue especially in this region of Africa (Figure 2). Many argue that so long as resources are not shared equitably, there can never be peace. Have historical conflicts been rooted in unfair resource allocation? The failure of leaders to follow fair and just practices amounts to bad governance. Moreover, the region is characterized by a harsh ecological environment, with arid or semi-arid land, little water, and limited grazing. Drought normally affects East Africa every five years or so, although many observers have reported more frequent drought events in recent years due to climate change (IGAD 2002).

There is no doubt that one of the ways to ensure peace and security in this troubled region is for policy makers to enact strategies aimed at enhancing food productivity, access and utilization.

Figure 3: Pathway to food and nutrition emergencies in East Africa



Source: Author

3. AFRICA'S DISEQUILIBRIUM

Three main underlying factors disorganize communities in sub-Saharan Africa, resulting in disharmony among the various populations in the region; these three factors are political, economic and environmental problems. Once disequilibrium is created, it spirals to both expected and unexpected consequences. These complex issues are broadly summarized below as dimensions that could be either causal or effects or both of disequilibrium.

Political Dimensions

Politics and Food Security

Probably the single most notable cause of famine and hunger in the Horn of Africa is greed, as leaders struggle for power at the expense of the masses. In East Africa, powerful leadership positions are rarely acquired through free and fair means. Once acquired, such power is often used to oppress citizens, plunder the country's resources, and corruptly divert foreign aid meant to improve the lives of needy people. It is estimated that more than 90 percent of all violent conflicts have taken place in developing countries, with African countries accounting for one-quarter of all wars (Nyong'o 1993, Hartung and Moix 2000).

In many cases, the principles of democracy have been ignored for the purpose of seizing power at whatever cost, as seen in Rwanda in 1994, Kenya in 2007 and the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2009. Similar situations have arisen at various times in Uganda, Angola, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Liberia, the Sudan, and Zimbabwe. Clearly, the list is long and ever-growing. The situation in Darfur is one of the saddest in the world, as there does not appear to be a solution in sight (IRINa 2008). The likelihood of famine increases in poor countries in which warring factions fight; likewise, famines are likely to result in wars.

Notably, none of the world's countries viewed as having strong commitments to democracy for example in North America and in Europe have been prone to famine, whereas most countries with repeated famine events can be categorized as "authoritarian," are ambiguously committed to democracy, and/or have some sort of contested sovereignty. Under such circumstances, economic vulnerability increases for households caught up in armed struggle, while other households are affected by the erosion of the government's ability to protect vulnerable groups or individuals. In many situations, those meant to protect become the perpetrators; this was seen in Kenya in early in 2008 and in the Congo in 2009. UN peace soldiers were reported to have sexually abused women and children by trading food for sexual favors (Lynch 2004). Unfortunately, conflict -associated problems with food policy and social-service provision have tended to receive limited attention until the political outcome is clarified, which can take many years, even decades.

The relationship between famine and war in Africa suggests that we should address the chronic and rapidly growing problems of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Kenya, which has a population of about 35 million, has a refugee population of more than 0.5 million, putting pressure on an already fragile environment (Kenya Red Cross 2007).

Failed Governance and Policy Vacuums

The major constraints to citizens' access to quality food in the East African region include distorted trade practices for both external and internal markets, as well as the policy makers' efforts to keep food security issues at the level of rhetoric until a food emergency becomes imminent. These countries have not learned from Asia's Green Revolution, which proved beyond reasonable doubt that any country seeking to develop must prioritize access to food, whether homegrown or imported. Perpetual food aid does not help, as it tends to distort local food markets. However, food aid to Africa is consistently required to sustain various populations, as famine emergencies become more frequent, worsening the status of the acutely

food insecure and making their condition chronic. Most countries of the region are subject to both political insecurity and natural disasters; in such situations, policies just do not work (Fig. 3). Policies that allow for movement of food and livestock and targeting for ration distribution often have run into problems where law and order break down due to conflict and food is scarce because of failed harvest In 2006, more than 3 million Kenyans required food aid to survive in the wake of a major drought affecting more than half the country, which was followed by killer floods. In any single year, these adverse conditions exist in some part of East Africa. However, even when such events are predicted, droughts and floods appear to catch the African governments unawares. The lack of policies aimed at managing these types of crises constitutes a major weakness in any country's food security strategy.

Effective crisis response requires the coordination of a variety of actors tasked with tackling the relevant challenges. In the above case, governments must combine humanitarian and developmental actions; this requires both country-level and regional policies aimed at coordinating assistance. At present, however, it is often unclear what policies or legal frameworks should inform the handling of both acute and protracted emergencies. For many development partners targeting remains a major non-articulated challenge. In many cases, there are elaborate plans for preventing and mitigating food poverty in the region, but these exist only on paper. Each time there is a report of starvation in world news, it is almost always in reference to a portion of Africa. In reality, best practices in targeting food aid do not apply, with the result that a large proportion of the food aid received by the region is diverted to people who need it least, due to corruption (Figure 2).

Africa is not standing still; like other parts of the world, it is constantly changing. However, it is not always clear in which direction is it changing. We need a better definition of the problem, and from there we need to formulate policies to effectively address the identified issues. At the moment, "food insecurity" is generally translated as "the need for food aid," meaning that the response comes mainly through emergency mechanisms. A quick analysis of responses to food insecurity indicates that most assistance requests are directed to food aid, which accounts for the majority of responses to both acute needs and reconstruction/development efforts (Benson 2008). It is a sad fact that most of the region's governments best know how to appeal to the international community for food and have done little to strategize on how to tackle this perpetual problem.

Some countries try to use emergency mechanisms to address chronic food insecurity; this is problematic, as it is unclear when such mechanisms should intervene, when they should pull out, and whom they should target. In this respect, analytical methods should be used to conduct vulnerability assessments aimed at precisely distinguishing between households facing a transient problem and those that are consistently food insecure, year after year, even when conditions improve. This would help address the enormous challenges that surround the targeting of beneficiary households and individuals (Benson 2007).

In Africa, national governments often see emergency food aid as a useful political tool, especially around election time. Furthermore, governments may delay food emergency responses in an effort to save money, in the expectation that external assistance will soon become available. In any case, governments rarely budget for these emergencies, even though they are no longer unpredictable. The governments of nations whose citizens are regularly caught up in food emergencies clearly need to become more responsible and enact preparedness plans intended to deal with such situations. Indeed, such plans could actually increase a country's economic strength in the long-run, given the huge economic costs of child malnutrition (Benson 2008). Many developing countries are unable to effectively monitor and supervise relief efforts (including the provision of food). Sometimes the officials charged with distributing relief items steal those items for sale or personal use, thereby diverting them from the intended beneficiaries.

Unfortunately, many governments prefer engaging in humanitarian responses rather than investing in long-term development, as the latter has a poor track record in many parts of Africa (albeit due mainly to mismanagement and accountability failures). Governments often view shock responses as a "donor issue," raising questions of sovereign responsibility, accountability, and responsibility. However, government capacity is still weak, and national governments are rarely the target audience for advocacy messages arising from civil society. New policies, legal frameworks and firm guidelines will be required

to streamline a sector that now presents major challenges for many sovereign states. All is not lost, however. The 2020 Conference for heads of state and top policy makers, which was held in Kampala (Uganda) in 2004, stimulated some changes in the way food and nutrition issues are handled by some countries, including Uganda (Benson 2008). This goes to show that lobbying, advocacy and presenting evidence-based information to policy makers can produce results.

Economic Dimensions

The eradication of hunger and poverty has proven difficult, even though it has been a stated goal of the international development community for more than half a century (Birner 2007). The number of hungry people has increased in recent years, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, where this parameter has shown no real improvement over the past four-plus decades.

Governance which has been discussed above affects many facets of people's lives including their economic environment.

As Kofi Annan, the immediate past secretary-general of the United Nations (UN) told world leaders in 1998: "Good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development" (Birner 2007). Governance is the exercise of economic, political, and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels. In defining good governance, the UN's Development Programme (UNDP) highlighted participation, accountability, transparency, consensus, sustainability, the rule of law, and the inclusion of the poorest and most vulnerable people in making decisions on the allocation of development resources (Birner 2007). A widely used set of aggregate data from a broad range of sources compiled by the World Bank Institute measures the following dimensions of good governance: political stability and the absence of violence; the rule of law; voice and accountability; regulatory quality; governmental effectiveness and control of corruption; and environmental governance (Birner 2007). Each of these dimensions of governance is important for eradicating hunger and poverty. Good governance has eluded many African countries, while others have shown mixed results. However, although some have exhibited political stability for a considerable period of time, these countries have not necessarily met the above-described characteristics. The dimensions of governance affect hunger and poverty in numerous ways.

As our understanding of the complex challenges of development has increased, various constraints have been linked to persistent poverty, including adverse weather conditions, the use of inappropriate technology, limited capital and education, cultural factors, and institutional/policy failures. In analyzing these challenges, governance has recently been identified as a key determinant for the success of any nation in poverty reduction efforts.

Closely associated with bad governance in East Africa are conflict and tribalism both of which impede democratic processes.

Thomas (2004) stated: "believe it or not one would think that the entire continent of Africa is engulfed perpetually in armed conflict." It is true that Africa, despite relatively low press coverage, seems to be the most warring region in the world. Nyong'o (1993) states that in 1996 there were 34 states engaged in major armed conflict worldwide; 15 of them were located in Africa. It seems likely that such conflicts arise over resources and the control over their distribution (Mundt 1990). Western powers have engaged in "cold wars;" this has inadvertently affected developing countries, which are forced to take sides as their survival comes to depend on their demonstrated support of one superpower over another. "Cold wars" have often involved the claiming of regions/countries along with their resources (e.g. land, minerals, oil, and/or strategic positioning, thus causing tension and affecting economic progress in a negative way.

Environmental Dimensions

A second major unsettling factor in sub-Saharan Africa is its environment (i.e., the ecological character of the continent). East Africa has become subject to erratic weather patterns and is often plagued by prolonged droughts followed by floods; these natural shocks trigger adverse consequences, including widespread food insecurity (GHA 2003). These conditions were previously expected approximately every five years; due to climate change, they now seem to be annual events with worsening consequences to human life. Climate change on the whole has affected the fragile ecosystems across sub-Saharan Africa, negatively impacted farmers, who are often uncertain when to plant, and may lose entire crops to heavy rains unexpectedly hitting just as cereals are drying in open fields. Although East Africa has not been hit as hard by these events compared to some surrounding areas, the region must of necessity share its production with refugees and surrounding, worse-off countries. Millions of sub-Saharan (approximately 154.3 million inhabitants of the 880 million in sub-Saharan Africa) are subject to harsh living conditions, which often precipitate food crises.

Drought

Drought is a common phenomenon in East Africa. Most of the region is either arid or semi-arid, often going for several seasons in a row without rain. This is devastating for a region that relies mostly on crop and livestock agriculture for the livelihoods of its inhabitants. The enduring impacts of the recent five-year drought will continue to affect the food security situation in East Africa for years to come, making the region a food deficit and food aid/importing zone unless drastic mitigation measures are taken.

Flood

Floods often follow long-running droughts, exacerbating the deleterious impacts in countries such as Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania (especially when rains peak during the long rainy season between April and June). The recurrence of flooding is as frequent as that of drought; the negative consequences invariably include fatalities, displacement of populations, destruction of farmland, and damage to infrastructure. Ironically, the environment is cyclically damaged by severe shortages of water followed by its massive overabundance in the absence of a means to harness the rainfall. In the 1950's, flood mitigation and irrigation schemes had been fully developed and were functioning, but apparently stalled soon after the country gained its independence in 1963. More recently, flood mitigation schemes have been enacted in flood-ravaged areas of Kenya, where donors (e.g., the World Bank) are funding a Five-Year Program in the west of the country (Budalangi).

Tsunami

The term "tsunami" was foreign to most ordinary Kenyans until December 2004, when a killer wave originating off the coast of Indonesia hit the area between Harfun and Garacad in Somalia, also affecting the Kenyan coast of Mombasa. The tsunami led to fatalities, destruction of property and infrastructure, and disruption to livelihoods, affecting an estimated 44,000 people, 22,000 of whom needed livelihood support in the aftermath. Short-term emergency needs (e.g., water, food and medicine) were generously donated immediately after the disaster; these donations were successfully delivered despite access constraints (OCHA 2005; IRINb 2008). The long-term impacts of the tsunami on the coastal communities (e.g., the need to restore livelihoods following the destruction of fishing boats and equipment) are still being felt today.

Due to climate change, it has been predicted (IFPRI/FAO 2008) that drought events will become more frequent and virulent in the years to come, meaning that traditional coping strategies will not be appropriate or adequate for the task. According to the Impact of Climate Change and Bio-energy on Nutrition report prepared jointly by IFPRI and the FAO, developing countries are likely to be hardest hit by climate change, with water scarcity becoming an increasing problem. Because the continent of Africa is not agro-ecologically homogenous, various regions are likely to experience different types of climate

change impacts. Already, changes in food habits, including differences in staple food preparation methods, have been attributed to climate change, although the involved populations may not have viewed it as such at the time (Devineau et al. 2008). Hulme and colleagues (2000) concluded from a thorough review of the literature that Africa's climate has changed over the last 100 years, but it is not clear to what extent this has been brought on by global warming Other reports have noted the widespread worsening of abject poverty and hunger in Africa during this period (Clover 2003).

As the weather deteriorates and hunger increases, crime and insecurity will increase, because a threat to livelihood and wealth is often translated directly into a threat to security and peace. Various forms of tension within and between communities can tend to spark violence (Fig. 2). Ethnic and clan conflicts are consistently noted as the main causes of unrest in Africa, with blood relations and neighbors fighting over water and grazing resources, the stealing of women and livestock, and quarrels over border lines. These are possible causes of conflict, especially in situations of scarcity. Tadesse (2003) stated that conflict continues to constitute one of the greatest challenges facing the Horn of Africa, while Baro and Deubel (2006) wrote of persistent hunger and vulnerability in sub-Saharan Africa.

4. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONFLICT AND FOOD/NUTRITION EMERGENCIES

Trade in and Possession of Illegal Arms

Conflicts have many direct and indirect effects on food security, many of which occur far from the fighting; these include a long list of obvious results, as well as some not so obvious effects. Livelihoods are directly affected in a fairly negative manner.

The Horn of Africa is rife with illegal arms, and their use leads to needless loss of life. Hundreds of people are killed in sporadic and periodic outbursts of violence, while cattle rustling (and attendant violence and generalized insecurity) is a perennial problem in the border areas between Kenya and Uganda. In an effort to reduce the levels of insecurity in the area, the governments of Kenya and Uganda are in the process of jointly implementing a disarmament exercise among their pastoral communities, with a focus on their common borders. Neighboring Sudan continues to face serious challenges to sustainable stability while violent conflict continues in Darfur (FEWSNET 2008).Kenya is negatively affected by this violence because of its porous borders with Sudan (Fig. 1). Economic vulnerability increases for households caught up in armed struggle, while other households are affected through the erosion of the government's ability to protect vulnerable populations. Many of the poor fall through the cracks as the middle class shrinks and the gap between the poor and rich widens, causing further tensions as the majority of citizens are affected by inequities and the unequal distribution of the country's resources. Somalia has not had a government for years and got one put I place only last year. Within one year, on June 18, 2009, a suicide attack killed the Somali Minister for Internal Affairs, throwing the country back into a state of emergency. As a consequence, more refugees poured across the border into Kenya.

The Horn of Africa displays all the characteristics of a politically challenged region, with insecurity exacerbated by civil/ethnic conflicts, cross-border wars and unregulated armaments of all sorts falling into many of the wrong hands (Kingma 1997). Sustainable political stability remains elusive in the region. Continuing conflict and incomplete, stalemated and increasingly violent transitions have created an uncertain and fluid operating environment, generating tensions between development-focused and humanitarian interventions. Regardless, probably the single most important underlying reason for the unfortunate conditions faced by the people of Africa lies in the failures of their governments to act. Where insecurity prevails, the governmental priorities rarely include feeding or protecting the citizenry. Instead, the governments of this region tend to focus on greed-fueled fights for power and supremacy.

Most of Africa's recent famines have occurred within the context of armed conflicts. These may be wars between countries or civil conflicts within communities. The latter have often been associated with challenges to political regimes that show a disregard for civil/human rights and participatory governance. In many instances, however, protracted civil conflict arises from territorial protectionism and competition over natural resources such as livestock, grazing land, water access, forest land, precious stones, and so on. These conflicts are often long-running and precipitate situations of insecurity that hamper economic growth and render the involved countries dependent on external support, including food aid. Women and children are significantly affected as the men continue to involve themselves in these wars. Such situations have occurred with disturbing regularity in Uganda, Rwanda and northern Kenya.

Civil War and Terrorist Acts

Historically, conflicts have involved traditional weapons, such as machetes, bows and arrows (IPU 2006). More recent fighting, however, has involved use of lethal munitions such as small and medium-sized guns, and in some cases, bombs. Consequently, many more individuals are affected by present day attacks, with increased numbers of fatalities, maimings, and individuals being rendered unproductive. People in the affected areas cannot anticipate any long-term peace, as attacks can come any time. When communities are unsettled, residents live in fear and worry about their children, with the result that they

cannot be positively productive or establish any sense of permanence. Finding livelihoods in such communities becomes a daily hassle, and distrust runs rampant.

It is very disturbing that sub-Saharan Africa is always at war with itself; this situation bars meaningful development even as existing infrastructure and capital is destroyed. The vicious cycle of ethnic conflict results in continuous human movement and a paucity of basic needs and services including food, shelter, dignity and enjoyment of life. When war and conflict break out, productivity diminishes and famine sets in because people are unable to source food. Hadley and Patil (2008) reported symptoms of anxiety and depression during seasonal changes in household food insecurity. Communities have developed survival and coping strategies that have allowed them to survive over generations but these survival skills may not be equal to the threats brought by modern warfare and climate change.

There are therefore two main scenarios explaining the continuing conflict and war in most of sub-Saharan Africa: fragile weather and climate change effects, and internal conflicts associated with various causes. In these communities, high levels of irritability and tension are likely to easily spark anger and fights. The two important overriding challenges common to all countries affected by crises, whether natural or manmade, are the increasing number of productive individuals involved in and affected by the crisis, and the sense of urgency to minimize mortality in dealing with these situations The situation is normally seen as particularly dire when children are involved. All this is fairly unsettling, to say the least, and negatively affects most countries, communities and households in sub-Saharan Africa.

Diminished Response to the Needs of Citizens

Linking information to better responses is crucial for more appropriate and timely outcomes. Although work in this area has gained momentum over time, a great deal still needs to be done. Notably, better responses to food insecurity are not just a technical issue; many times stakeholders overlap in their functions, compete negatively or fight over limited resources, thereby complicating the task and delaying the delivery of services. In many needy countries, databases on the numbers of vulnerable groups requiring emergency food are unavailable or highly unreliable. Because resources are limited and people's needs immense, situations usually become dire.

Information

It is not possible to act effectively without reliable information. Information systems need not be complex or sophisticated (UN2005; SADC 2005). The establishment of evidence-based information systems to inform on the scale of food needs have served as a prerequisite for broad and effective interventions in the relevant countries. Such systems have further promoted a better understanding of vulnerability issues, encouraged the broad participation of numerous stakeholders, provided key information for the humanitarian assistance community, and influenced both donor and government policies related to emergency and poverty responses.

Despite some significant successes, however, the link between information systems and policy decisions could be enhanced even further. Strong national and regional hunger and vulnerability assessment institutions with the potential for generating objective and comprehensive surveillance information on emergency responses vs. food security situations should strive to provide leadership in this area. To date, the over-riding emergency focus has meant that these institutions are only visible during crisis periods. In light of the increasing frequency of emergency situations, these groups should move beyond the traditional crisis approach to support a longer-term focus that is more relevant for governments and external agencies. Capacity building at the local and regional levels could help make experts available to advise political leaders and provide basic information to the beneficiary communities. In the 1980's, Kenya received funding from the Word Bank to train personnel and revamp the Central Bureau of Statistics, which is now capable of generating and providing reliable data with the right incentives (the issue of personnel incentives lies squarely with the government). Similarly, other institutions collate information from many reliable sources and make the data available to all countries in East Africa (FEWSNET 2009).

Preparedness

In the context of preparedness, it is important to identify who can perform what task best, whether these individuals are prepared to do so and what criteria should be used to allocate responsibilities. It is generally recognized that chronic food insecurity is not being adequately addressed. In this respect, social protection aimed at providing an alternative to emergency food aid, particularly in the form of multi-annual safety nets, that involves families being able to receive or access a minimum package of support for family should be incorporated into the current thinking. For example, using long-term financing from government budgets, food crises may be pre-empted or averted by regular transfers of cash and/or food, along with and other efforts to strengthen the livelihoods of people facing chronic hunger (OCHA 2005).

The rationale behind safety nets is that most food shortages in Africa are predictable, as they are sparked by adverse weather or conflict. A predictable problem requires a planned response rather than a short-term (potentially haphazard) emergency response. The key is to bring national governments to the center of efforts to tackle hunger, thereby increasing their accountability and responsibility. Some agencies may be understandably skeptical about this emphasis on social protection, while for others, social protection is indicative of failed relief requiring humanitarian efforts. However, in some instances it may be more accurate to say that the problem is a failure in the way food aid has been used in place of longer-term investments. Building resilience requires a more predictable response mechanism and a robust move away from actions that are perceived to be failing toward more tangible results-oriented responses.

One of the most convincing arguments in favor of the multi-annual safety net strategy is its cost-effectiveness for national governments. Currently, many African governments would rather send out emergency appeals than initiate emergency response efforts themselves. They virtually expect someone else to feed their "hungry children" for them. Few of these governments have the capacity to absorb the budgetary requirements of a sudden emergency that requires large operations. Finance ministries are often uncomfortable with the distortions that huge relief operations cause in the local markets. However, they are generally more interested in economic growth than in setting up social assistance programs for the poorest. There is an urgent need for the donor community and governments to continually emphasize the synergies between social protection and economic growth, rather than seeing the two as mutually exclusive. Building resilience to shocks also means enabling people to increase their productivity and engage more actively in development processes. Unfortunately, this thinking has not yet taken root in policy discussions in most African countries. But one should ask: Is the whole concept of social safety nets a new one? Are there examples of these programs in the industrialized world? For example, how did food stamps arise in America? How about unemployment benefits in Europe? Furthermore, are there examples of traditional (though perhaps outmoded) food safety systems within African communities?

Answers to these questions do exist and so one does not have to re-invent the wheel. In the industrialized world there are safety nets and traditionally in Kenya there were safety nets to help families cope during famine.

Diminished Capacity to Produce

It is disturbing that Africa, which needs food so badly, largely fails to employ modern high-yield farming methods. Compared to other regions of the world, farmers in sub-Saharan Africa use the least fertilizer per hectare of farmland, plant hybrid seeds only rarely, and still utilize rudimentary farm implements. The 25th Food and Agriculture Regional Conference for Africa came to a close in June 2008 in Nairobi without much resolution. This is surprising given that the meeting was being held against a back-drop of rapidly escalating food prices, particularly in the sub-Saharan Africa region. The underlying resolution was that funding for agriculture should be increased to boost production, but many such promises have been made in the past without any real change. The conference members also urged that there should be a shift from rain-dependent agriculture to irrigation-managed agriculture. There is a good reason for this

recommendation: only 7 percent of the continent's arable land is subjected to irrigated farming. Among the African countries, Egypt is exceptional in that it is generally a desert, yet over 80 percent of the population is comfortably fed through irrigated agriculture, and there is even some exportable surplus, for example the rice that is exported through the COMESA market. How can Egypt enjoy such success when other African countries, some boasting better water source systems, complain of being unable to feed their people because of drought? Compared to Egypt, Kenya has a larger water mass, more fertile land, and less than half the population, yet Kenya imports USD1.3 billion worth of food (Kenya Times, June 23, 2008). About 65 percent of Africa's population is affected by land degradation, with over 80 percent of rural inhabitants living in abject poverty as they farm nutrient-depleted soil that is incapable of producing enough to feed their families. As rural areas become less and less productive, people migrate to mushrooming slums in the urban centers. Clearly, a food shortage catastrophe is on the horizon for the urban consumers. Following the FAO Africa Summit Conference, journalist Lumiti Khabuchi headlined an article in the Kenya Times (June 23, 2008): "Why African Governments Should Stop Paying Lip Service to Food Crisis." These governments have, indeed, paid lip service; visionary leaders would understand the consequences of not enacting strategies to feed this fast-growing population.

Increased Disease Burden

HIV/AIDS is generally accepted as the largest current threat to Africa's development, in part because it affects the continent's most crucial resource: people. A new type of food crisis has arisen due to HIV/AIDS, which has created a new category of highly vulnerable households of people living with who have died of HIV/AIDS. Four factors have been identified as explaining the grim projection of recovery for these households: interactions between malnutrition and HIV/AIDS; the burden of care; loss of assets and skills; and declines in food production (De Waal and Whiteside 2005). In addition to HIV/AIDS, malaria has re-emerged in recent years, and now threatens to kill many children. Unfortunately, African governments failed to eradicate this menace at a time when DDT was still environmentally acceptable. Most countries that successfully eradicated malaria used DDT at the time of eradication, but now oppose its use. We can only hope that a vaccine is found soon. The same holds true for tuberculosis. In addition, households are negatively affected by non-communicable diseases such as cancer, stroke, cardiovascular disease, diabetes, etc., which can affect all segments of society in Africa as these conditions drain households of their financial resources that go towards medical treatment of their loved ones.
The sick are also a resource that can no longer be available to the family. Micronutrient deficiency ailments are rampant among the poor in Africa, due to inadequate consumption of foods rich in iron, vitamin A and zinc, while protein/energy deficiency stills affects the poor and children in East Africa. Thus, people in this region experience multiple burdens of disease, hunger, poverty and malnutrition. Analyses point to tribalism as the most potent political force in Africa (Scherrer 2002; Thomas 2004). This force is displayed in various forms. In many countries, including Kenya, tribalism is an undercurrent that boils over in response to a spark, such as the 2008 post-election violence in Kenya. In some countries, tribalism has remained at the "discrimination" level, while in others (e.g., Zimbabwe and Sudan) it has emerged as outright violations of human rights. In many African countries, neither politicians nor their constituents feel much sense of national identity; rather, politicians often expect to (and are expected to) favor members of their own tribes and families.

Heightening of Ethnic Tensions

The population of Kenya comprises more than 42 distinctly different tribes, each with its own unique language. The language of Swahili arose from Arabic during the days of the slave trade; over time, Swahili has spread from slave-trading centers on the Mombasa coast to other parts of the country. In an attempt to minimize tribal tension upon gaining independence in 1963, the Kenyan government declared Swahili as the medium of communication. However, it took more than 40 years for all primary schools countrywide to teach Swahili; the present generation of school-going youngsters is fluent in the language.

As Swahili has been universalized, the vernacular languages have increasingly been phased out of the schools. However, most Kenyans remain fairly rural, with their mother tongue as their first language and tribal culture firmly entrenched during childhood. Early efforts aimed at encouraging Kenyans to develop a sense of nationhood stalled in the decades following independence; today, very strong tribal undertones threaten the country's development. Over 80 percent of all Kenyans are rural based (Omosa and McCormick 2004). Official figures released in January 2007 estimated the population of Kenya at 36.1 million in 2006 (GoK 2007).

Kenyans are typically rural-based, and are entrenched in their tribal ways from birth until early adulthood, when they might get a chance to socialize with people from other tribes. Sentiments against other tribes start building up slowly and become solidified through the media (e.g., through radio reports and politicians' speeches). With the liberalization of the media at the turn of the 21st century 2000, a number of vernacular radio stations emerged; during the 2008 post-election violence they were used to pass hate messages. Unfortunately, there has been no national ethos to promote Kenyan unity and discourage discrimination based on tribal differences. Politicians (and even some parents) unfortunately capitalize on this whenever it suits them. It is no wonder that by the time of the 2007 elections (and at similar times previously), it was not difficult to find Kenyans who hated members of other tribes, even though they had never met or interacted with members of those tribes. Hate for other tribes is entrenched through indoctrination and manipulation. This was the recipe for the post-election violence of 2008 (following the 2007 elections), which left hundreds of thousands of Kenyans displaced and without food. Notably, however, some analysts including the author have suggested that ethnicity was just an excuse, with the underlying cause of the violence resting with issues of inequity and historical injustices that have gone uncorrected for decades.

Thomas (2004) stated that: "most Africans are not mere ethnics who wear funny hats and eat indigestible food on the national day of their old country. They are proud tribes' people. They honor their ancestors, respect traditional customs and have a strong sense of solidarity with fellow members of their tribe. Yet any mention by outside commentators of tribalism in twenty-first century Africa is taboo, unless it is a mocking reference to the 'white tribe' which dominated the continent's southern tip during the apartheid era."

Robert Guest (2006), in his book *The Shackled Continent*, wrote: "Most Africans feel more loyalty to their tribe than to the young nation-states of which they are citizens."

A number of theories have been proposed to explain why most Africans feel more tribal than national, including an aversion to any outsider who mentions tribalism, borders drawn arbitrarily by imperial masters, and the separation or forced blending of tribes based on these false divisions. The colonial powers capitalized on tribal differences by applying the "divide and rule" strategy that has persisted into present day governance styles. African politicians frequently use such methods to disorganize communities, fuel tensions, and play favorites as a means to sustain their grip on power. This tends to increase inter- and intra-community divisions and tensions. However, all proposals to redraw the tribal lines have been universally resisted (even by the UN) since it is feared such a move might fuel more violence than it solves (Thomas 2004). More on Kenya's post-election violence in 2008 can be found in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2.

5. FOOD EMERGENCIES: RESPONSES AND MITIGATION

Whatever the cause of a food emergency, a response is required.

Responses to Food Emergencies

Drought, floods, erratic weather conditions, water source pollution, and sudden threats to physical security can all spark major food and nutrition emergencies. Although armed conflict is frequent, it is not something people get used to; sudden fighting or raids can cause panic and drive people away from their productive areas. This again can spark a food emergency. Because many African economies are weak, relying mostly on agriculture even in agriculturally weak areas, seasonal crop failure can also lead to a food crisis.

Food aid is a major component of any type of response to a food crisis, in both the short and long terms. A great deal has been written about the advantages and disadvantages of food aid. In this paper, we shall give only some highlights. The region under discussion receives considerable quantities of food aid from a number of "well-to-do" countries. However, most often this food aid comes as an emergency response and stops as soon as the crisis-associated deaths trail off. The UN's World Food Program (WFP) and the Red Cross are among the organizations that mobilize food aid. The demand for food aid seems to have increased as more conflict areas are reported (OCHA 2004; OCHA 2005; UN 2008).

On the smaller scale, communities have traditionally had their own response mechanisms to crises, especially where food shortages are common and may be anticipated. However, while historical conflicts involved spears and knives, modern attacks involve guns and may kill many more members of a village, especially the men all at once. In cases of hunger weather-related crop failure, pastoralists might move in search of water and greener pastures for their livestock, while farmers might plant drought-resistant crops (as required by many governments).

Giles (2007) wrote that African communities have been adapting to climate change for millennia. For example, in El Fasher, an impoverished state capital in western Sudan, rural people used to rely on weak rains to raise crops in sandy soils. However, the region's rainfall had been below average since the turn of the 20th century. In response to this climate change, a million people have vanished from the region (either through migration or death) and community coping strategies have broken down.

Long-Term Strategies for Mitigation

Although disasters should ideally be prevented, this is not always possible. Therefore, governments and communities should have mitigation and preparedness measures in place, in the hopes of minimizing the negative impacts of any eventuality.

Publicity

When disasters receive publicity in the media, important organizations such as the UN are likely to take notice and facilitate positive responses from around the world. By the time the news breaks globally, however, local areas have typically sustained horrendous damage and fatalities, and hunger is often rampant due to the lack of internal mechanisms to deal with the crisis. By the time resources are mobilized, the affected communities have sustained gaping wounds that will need time to heal. Thus, peace restoration and reconstruction takes much longer than it would have if the issue had been publicized (and a response triggered) earlier.

The most highly publicized type of natural disaster is Africa is undoubtedly drought, which is often followed by terrible flooding. In declaring 10 October as the International Day for Natural Disaster Reduction, the UN recognized flooding as one of the most frequent and widespread environmental hazards. According to the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, between

1993 and 2002, flood disasters "affected more people across the globe - 140 million per year on average - than all the other natural or technological disasters put together."(IFRC 2002).

The UK Environment Agency and the UK-based Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research also recognized that floods cause more damage than any other natural disaster (TCCCR 2009). Huge annual losses result from flood-induced disruptions to economic livelihoods, businesses, infrastructure, services and public health. In developing countries, where infrastructure is often weak, flooding can cause major difficulties and significantly delay development.

Beyond the immediate physical threat of the floodwaters, there are numerous longer-term health risks. For example, according to the World Health Organization (WHO), flooding can increase exposure to toxins and pathogens, affect mental health, and disrupt the capacity of healthcare systems to respond to health crises (FEWS NET 2006). These events need to be publicized, as they have become global events.

Furthermore, the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2000) predicts that climate change is likely to intensify flooding hazards in many areas of the world. Although the available computer models cannot yet definitively predict where, when, or by how much flood hazards will change, specialists suggest that existing flood-prone locations and some coastal and river-basin areas will become more vulnerable to severe flooding in the years to come. Thus, there is need for more concerted action to better prepare populations for the negative impact of climate change. The world is facing a new responsibility to protect the most vulnerable populations from floods and other weather-related disasters. The IPCC further recognizes that flooding risks are shaped as much by social as by natural forces. To quote the IPCC: "Poor communities may therefore be particularly vulnerable, especially when concentrated in high-risk and often environmentally degraded areas" (FEWSNET 2006, 2009).

In sum, publicity is a crucial part of the food emergency response, even for governments. Publicity can not only alert a government to a problem, it can also act as a tool through which the government can reach out for international relief and other forms of external assistance.

Sharing Best Practices

Knowledge transfer is a good means for tackling crises, since it means that responders are not required to "re-invent the wheel." There is plenty of existing knowledge on the management of crisis impacts, albeit outside the African continent. This knowledge needs to be shared and used to reduce the suffering of people in crisis. In the context of flood management, a good example can be seen in the case of Bangladesh, where an effective early warning system called the Flood Forecasting and Warning System (FFWS) has been put into place along with other mitigation measures, such as appropriate land-planning strategies, mapping of high-risk areas, improvement of legislation to control flood-plain development, and high population awareness and preparedness. This has reduced the impact of floods in Bangladesh, although recent reports suggest there is still room for improvement. With the world media focusing on the potential effects and importance of climate change, experts argue that it is important to educate at-risk populations and communicate flood mitigation strategies as widely as possible (FEWSNET 2006; RCMRD 2006; LEWS/GLCRSP 2006).

Small Measures can Help Prevent Catastrophic Outcomes

Even small measures can be effective in saving lives. In the absence of adaptation measures, flood risks are exacerbated. Although this is considered particularly relevant to developing countries, the devastation wrought in the USA by Hurricane Katrina in 2005 was a reminder that even the most developed nations must actively work to protect their citizens against natural disasters. With the prospect of worsening weather patterns and disaster events in the near future, all nations should seek to modernize their mitigation and coping strategies.

Experts have long recommended that disaster-risk reduction must be successfully incorporated into broader sustainable development goals aimed at fostering more resilient communities. There are signs that governments worldwide, including that of Uganda, are recognizing the increasing threat of natural disasters and beginning to take action individually and regionally. In November 2006, government

representatives and experts met in Nairobi Kenya to design a five-year disaster reduction program. The ISDR and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change partnered in this initiative to help reduce future flood losses. Other African governments have committed to the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action (2005-2015), and are also adopting measures to reduce the impacts of floods. For example, the Ugandan government's multi-sectoral Department of Disaster Management and Refugees has created, with support from the ISDR, a national platform to plan and implement coordinated mitigation and response initiatives in line with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Lessons learned from each crisis must be analyzed and acted upon in order for future floods to remain natural events and not evolve into major human disasters. Information arising out of such analyses should then be shared with countries that face similar vulnerabilities (FEWSNET 2006; RCMRD 2006; LEWS/GLCRSP 2006).

Facilitating Social Dialogue

Communication is a necessary step towards conflict management. Crisis prevention, which is an important part of managing conflicts and social crises in particular, greatly benefits from social dialog, strong social partners, and their active participation in the process of defining and enacting policies. Such crises rarely hit countries that have a structure and tradition of social dialog, as these mechanisms provide avenues for citizens to share their ideas and channel their grievances. Social dialog is also a main indicator of good governance, even at the community level (OCHA 2005b). Most crises, such as those occurring during socio-political transitions, expose problems in governance, institutional paucity, and failures to follow democratic principles. Government and civil society dialog is therefore essential to the achievement of long-lasting political stability and peace. Talking out issues usually helps dampen tempers and sometimes even yields a solution.

Supporting Entry into Gainful Employment

Entry into gainful employment is easier to realize in a peaceful and stable environment. Employment creation is a major challenge for many countries, particularly those in the Horn of Africa, where many people rely on farm incomes yet increasingly fewer people can truly be called real farmers. In these countries, employment-promoting activities need to have short-term objectives, such as job creation and income generation (e.g., through micro-businesses), and these objectives need to be congruent with the country’s medium- and long-term goals. Obviously, this can only be achieved if all the concerned stake-holders and constituents are involved in defining policies.

6. THE WAY FORWARD

Africa is culturally, economically, and politically varied, engendering complex challenges that require the attention of a concerted and united front. Unfortunately, although some attempts are being made at the African Union level, Africa cannot boast of ever having acted in unison. This section summarizes the various actors and emphasizes the areas that will need to be improved if we hope to correct the situation in East Africa.

Governments

The role of the government in all matters affecting the citizenry cannot be over-emphasized. The international press consistently presents pictures of African women, children, sick and elderly either on the move in search of refuge or emaciated and scrambling for food and water. These unpleasant pictures evoke sympathy and trigger frantic fundraising efforts by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), with funds often coming from ordinary taxpayers across the industrialized world. Unfortunately, this funding is unlikely to continue as the worldwide economy (including the economies of traditional donor countries) faces the worst financial downturn in over six decades and suffers the associated losses of jobs and homes.

Therefore, African governments should initiate comprehensive studies aimed at exploring the policy and economic dimensions of a food/nutrition crisis. All attempts to act in an *ad hoc* manner should be avoided. Furthermore, attempts should be made to strengthen the existing emergency structures, in the hopes of improving each country's capacity to mitigate crises. The governments should facilitate vulnerability assessments in an effort to identify the areas and socioeconomic groups that are most in need of food aid, in the hopes of improving the overall efficiency of emergency responses. As a strategy to attract more donor assistance, countries should seek to create a domestic environment that facilitates the work of humanitarian organizations. At present, existing policies are sometimes ignored with impunity by corrupt leaders.

Existing assessments indicate that in some regions and instances, food and nutrition insecurity crises are as much general crises of livelihoods or development as opposed to simple food shocks. This is attributed to the failure of governments to understand and adequately address their citizens' increasing vulnerability to changing political and socioeconomic environments. Due to this failure, even a modest external threat (e.g., erratic rainfall) can be sufficient to trigger widespread suffering. The complexity of such crises, which are now recognized as having both acute and chronic dimensions, cannot be underestimated. This implies that future investigation should focus not just on food availability, but rather on developing a broader understanding of the relevant risks and vulnerabilities, including the roles of access and entitlement in food insecurity (Tibbo 2006).

Governments should create a forum where all constituents involved in crisis response can communicate their activities and approaches, and discuss how to improve the effectiveness of their response strategies vis-à-vis the crises of the present and future. Such forums would provide a unique consultative process that may help governments refine their strategies and programs, and could be used as a source of relevant recommendations for and impact analyses of crisis-response mechanisms in different contexts.

The International Community

The MDGs are a set of ambitious goals drafted by the United Nations in 2000, with the aim of helping developing countries increase their education levels, reduce their poverty levels, and improve the health situations of their poor. The MDGs are to be achieved by 2015, but many African countries are unlikely to reach the stated benchmarks by this time. It is often argued that Africa's slow growth is associated with political instability and bad policy outcomes such as low education levels, underdeveloped financial systems, distorted foreign exchange markets, high government deficits and inadequate infrastructure. The

policy records of countries in Africa contrast sharply with those in more successful economies, notably those in East Asia. We must therefore ask ourselves: Should the African governments leave it to the UN alone to set targets? Could the governments develop effective, self-initiated collaborations aimed at exchanging ideas and sharing good practices? Although it is likely that such efforts are ongoing, they are not yet occurring on a large enough scale to make a difference.

In the 1960's, the FAO and other development agencies (e.g., Oxfam) initiated the Freedom from Hunger Campaign, which was the first attempt to address the problem of food insecurity through more than just food aid. The campaign set out to involve developing countries in analyzing the causes of food crises and malnutrition, and to find sustainable solutions. In short, the campaign sought to enable people to grow or earn enough to feed themselves (Oxfam 2006; Benson 2007).

Nearly five decades later, however, that worthy intention has not been fulfilled in all parts of the world. While conditions vary greatly across Africa, 33 percent of sub-Saharan Africans are undernourished compared with 17 percent of people in developing countries as a whole. The proportion is even worse in some countries, rising to 55 percent in Central Africa (Oxfam 2006). The average number of food emergencies in Africa per year has almost tripled since the mid 1980's. With regard to the MDGs, at the current rates of progress, most African countries will not be able to halve the number of hungry by the 2015 deadline. These failures stem in part from the fact that emergency aid (and food aid in particular) has remained the chief instrument through which external agents address food crises. Although food aid saves lives, it does not offer long-term solutions, and may even exacerbate food insecurity. These challenges are commonly accepted, yet spending on humanitarian aid has risen substantially over time while aid for agricultural production and research in sub-Saharan Africa dropped by 43 percent between 1990-92 and 2000-02. Worse, neither the African administrations nor the first world governments have done enough to tackle the root causes of hunger. We must now face the fact that we are dealing with food crises in Africa that may, in part, be blamed on the inadequacies of our responses to earlier crises.

In terms of mitigation, some of the causes of the current devastating food emergencies facing Africa could not have been foreseen 46 years ago. For example, HIV/AIDS is exacting a terrifying toll on one of Africa's key resources for food production: human capital. By 2020, a fifth of the agricultural workforce in the southern African countries will have been claimed by AIDS. Climate change is another unprecedented threat to food security. This will particularly affect the most vulnerable sections of the population, namely the smallholders and nomadic pastoralists that rely on rain-fed agriculture. Researchers have credibly predicted that 55 to 65 million more Africans will be at risk of hunger by the 2080's, as a result of a global temperature rise of less than 2.5°C. Most striking, however, is the deadly impact of Africa's conflicts, which have caused more than half of the continent's food crises in recent years. In every country that has suffered a prolonged food emergency, war or civil strife has played a major part in the crisis. Although African governments have a responsibility to protect their populations, they persistently fail to do so (as in northern Uganda) or are even complicit in the violence (as in Darfur).

According to the FAO, the proportion of human-induced food emergencies has more than doubled over the past 14 years. But what humans have broken, humans can mend. Oxfam firmly believes that the hunger and starvation seen in much of Africa in this first decade of the 21st century may be inevitable, but are clearly morally unacceptable. Many policies that have distorted world trade to the disadvantage of sub-Saharan Africa are externally driven, meaning that the international community must fix the wrongs. Greater external assistance is needed, potentially financed from the recent G8 commitments to increase development aid and debt relief (Reuters 2009). An important lesson from the flawed market reforms introduced in the 1980's by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (and backed by major donors) is that rural markets on their own cannot deliver food security.

International NGOs (e.g., the Red Cross, CARE, OXFAM, Save the Children and others) can be useful in the management of different types of humanitarian disaster. Such organizations often have the expert personnel needed for quick responses. They also have a credibility that enables them to quickly raise resources from across the world. Some of this capacity and resources should be transferred to local NGOs that are closer to the problem areas. Furthermore, there is a need for increased transparency in the disbursement of resources by these groups.

Thus, there is considerable scope for effective international action, even in the presence of violent conflicts in famine-prone countries. The foundation to forestall famine under non-war conditions must be laid early on, and in some cases, famine-prevention policies may serve to prevent war. In the future, famine prevention should be based on recognizing the boundaries of human suffering rather than the boundaries defined by politics and geography.

The Private Sector

The private sector is assuming an increasingly important role in the social sector, often due to pressure to "give back" to those who make their businesses succeed. Donor agencies and governments who are committed to improving service delivery to their citizens are keen to use the private sector's efficient networks for this purpose.

Notably, agents in the private sector ultimately want to make money, so they might ask: How are we supposed to make money from people who are hungry, poor and sick? These agents must be reminded of their social responsibility, but they should also look at the long-term benefits of early investment in services that will lead populations towards sound health. Given the events of the recent past, when irresponsible behavior and lack of regulation among big corporations and the banking sector caused billions of people across the world to lose their life savings, it may take some time before the private sector can truly be considered an example of good practice. However, going forward, it could be hoped that the public sector may learn a great deal from the way private sector carries out its business. Due recognition of some private sector partners may cause less generous development players to apply some best practices. Indeed, working in a complementary manner appears to be bearing fruit in some quarters as is the case now between private sector and public and civil society sectors in addressing micronutrient deficiencies.

7. CONCLUSION

The recent food shortage that has affected many communities across the globe has caused many hungry people to angrily demonstrate against the scarcity of essential commodities and increases in consumer prices, particularly for staple foods. This region was a net exporter of food in the 1970's (Kirwan et al. 2007), but now suffers from perpetual food shortage crises. Responses have often come from outside the region, but this aid has typically addressed the area's acute hunger without dealing with the long-term impacts on health and nutrition. These emergency responses often focus on managing the emergency and the immediate recovery efforts, but once the situation calms and the news quickly fades from the international radar screen, little attention is paid. Reconstruction efforts are therefore often shorted, because by the time deaths from one emergency have tapered off, another emergency in another part of the world has claimed the attention of the relief community.

Therefore, the responsibility must perforce be taken up by the governments of the affected countries. They can seek outside assistance from Africa's many friends in the international community. But like the owner of a burning house, concerned governments must first and foremost protect their own (e.g., against human rights abuses, etc.). Furthermore, governments must facilitate decent and affordable housing for the majority, ensure justice for all, protect the environment for current and future generations, protect relevant societal and cultural values while observing and adhering to acceptable international norms, and where possible provide for the enjoyment of life by citizens. However, such enjoyment is impossible when the majority of citizens do not know where their next meal is going to come from or how to get treatment when they are sick. In most African countries, including Kenya, leaders are preoccupied with getting and maintaining power at any cost. Unfortunately, once a leader attains a position of power, he can often do whatever he wants without being questioned.

At present, there is probably need to form the equivalent of the International Criminal Court within the social sector, with the goal of creating certain minimum standards that governments must meet. Such a mechanism should aim at preventing mass suffering; unfortunately, it may be difficult to prevent the suffering of a few, particularly at the start of a crisis. Currently, the international community takes far too long to respond to crises, and the mandate of UN peace-keepers seems pointless if they cannot prevent atrocities, despite their numbers and armaments. Given that about 17,000 UN peacekeepers recently came under fire in the Congo, and were unable to protect the people they had been sent to help, it would seem to be time to review these rules and mandates.

Major efforts are needed to improve the quality of government intervention in food emergency situations, which is too often dogged by corruption and a lack of capacity. Moreover, donor institutions such as the World Bank are rightly accused of having fallen short of their own declared standards in failing to enforce conditions that would ensure proper use and full accountability of loans and aid. Governments and donors must ensure that resources are translated into concrete benefits for Africa's poor and hungry. This will require that local civil society organizations step up to play major roles in monitoring aid flows and speaking out when things go wrong. To ignore such issues is to betray the hungry of Africa. Industrialized countries must also do much more to ensure that unjust international trade rules do not destroy rural livelihoods. They must act to stabilize the volatile commodity prices that create terrible hardship for African producers. The rich-country trading blocs must stop forcing open African markets for their own benefit, and end the dumping of their subsidized farm produce. In the past three decades, Africans have benefited from an increasing awareness of freedom, better education, and a heightened understanding of why it was important to struggle for independence. However, citizens in a number of African countries most likely feel worse off now than they did prior to before independence.

At the end of the day, everyone has a responsibility to get Africa as a whole, and East Africa in particular, back on track.

8. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Modern information and communications technology should be fully employed to improve communication and dialog in the region and to enhance trade. Information, communications and technology (ICT) should prove to be a cheap and efficient means of bridging the digital divide between the rich and the poor.
2. National budgets should include funds for food assistance and other resources aimed at assisting vulnerable groups, such as children and those who are HIV/AIDS affected, and helping households boost small-scale food production. The government must help manage security and monitor the costs of inputs to ensure the success of small-scale farmers, who are the main food producers in East Africa. Given that local coping systems seem to have disintegrated, it will also be crucial to facilitate the building of longer-term resilience by instituting social protection systems.
3. There are currently too many players addressing the various food crises in Africa, including the AU/NEPAD**, which has been helping governments develop longer-term strategies for addressing high food prices, and the WFP, which is involved at both the regional and national levels. However, there is little coordination among the various groups, and it is difficult to measure the overall impact or the respective impacts of the various players. In the future, it will be important to coordinate and assess these groups, and key decision makers should be updated regularly as each situation evolves.
4. All generated information and proposed responses must be consistent with the Comprehensive Framework for Action prepared by the High Level Task Force on the Global Food Crisis established by the UN Secretary General (UNS 2008). Key decision makers must be encouraged (or perhaps forced) to take timely action upon receipt of early warning information, which is typically available three months ahead of the predicted events.

   **AU=Africa Union; NEPAD=New Partnership for African Development
5. National policy processes tend to treat under-nutrition as a business-as-usual issue. There is no drama associated with this pervasive problem, which is not perceived as being critical to the country's future, the government's continued political success, or the well-being of citizens. As a consequence, there is low political demand for action against under-nutrition, and most governments in sub-Saharan Africa do very little to ensure that nutrition-related goods and services are provided to their citizens (Benson 2008).
6. Regional organizations and other peace-keeping entities (including development partners) should strive to ensure political stability and the absence of violence. A stable environment is a fundamental precondition for food security and development.
7. Governments should ensure adequate access by the poor and disadvantaged groups, especially the rural poor and women, to justice and the rule of law t avoid acts of desperation and violence.
8. Everyone needs to feel they can be heard and get their issues resolved. A country's citizens should be able to participate in selecting their government in a free, fair and nonviolent way. Citizens need to be assured of their leaders' accountability, their own freedoms of expression and association, and a free media.
9. Ensuring equity is part of good governance. Where policies fail to ensure fair play and equitable distribution of national resources, those who are negatively affected tend to respond in ways that can disturb the public peace. Policies should be implemented with the aim of decreasing plundering (corruption) by public officials.
10. Environmental governance is a fairly new concept that is nonetheless critical. Because the poorest people depend on agriculture for their livelihoods, special attention should be paid to

the management of natural resources (e.g., water, soil, range lands, and forests), in an effort to ensure that hunger and poverty reduction strategies are sustainable in the long run. The best way to achieve such goals is to involve the relevant communities in the dialogue.

9. APPENDICES

Appendix 1. Kenya

Famed for its wildlife, natural beauty and prehistoric sites, Kenya was under British control from 1895 until the country gained independence in 1963. The population of Kenya is diverse, comprising more than 40 ethnic groups. In the recent past, terrorism, banditry, cross-border raids, cattle rustling and instability caused by crises in neighboring Somalia and Sudan have threatened the peace and security in Kenya. The WFP classifies Kenya as a low-income, food-deficit country (IRINa 2008). Vulnerability to drought and food shortage is widespread in the arid and semi-arid districts of the country's northern, coastal and eastern areas. Endemic poverty, low productivity from the drought-prone arid and semi-arid lands, and high population growth have all contributed to increasing hunger. The country is also flood-prone, with devastating floods often following crippling drought. Food insecurity is highest in urban slums, and among pastoralists and marginal agriculturalists in the remote arid and semi-arid lands that comprise 80 percent of Kenya's land mass. Although the latest information reveals that HIV/AIDS is now under control, with the number of new infections decreasing, the disease is another risk to food security as it has taken a heavy toll on the productive workforce. The WFP offers a School Feeding Programme in Kenya, providing food to children in drought-prone areas.

Kenya was the scene of one of the most intense emergency situations in the recent past. Just before the general elections held on 26 December 2007, *The Economist* magazine (7 June 2007) described Kenya as an African success story, with unprecedented economic growth over the five-year administration of the incumbent, President Kibaki. This was in contrast to the tenure of Kibaki's predecessor, Moi, who governed for 24 years amidst accusations of corruption, incompetence and nepotism. In fairness, Moi's first ten years in office had fairly good indicators. He overstayed, however, and the latter 14 years of his tenure negated the early positive outcomes. By the time he left office in 2003, the economy had virtually ground to a halt, with economic growth below 1 percent annually. At the end of Kibaki's first five-year term in 2007, annual economic growth was estimated at 7 percent. Kenya is geo-politically strategic, with the seaport of Mombasa serving as the nearest major sea access point for a number of landlocked countries in the region, including Uganda, Rwanda and Ethiopia. These countries depend on the port of Mombasa and a sizeable portion of Kenya's road transport system to service their economies

As of 2002, although civil conflict had become the norm in the Greater Horn of Africa, Kenya was described as an island of peace in the conflict-troubled region. This changed abruptly and unexpectedly when violence erupted in Kenya in early 2008. Despite the country's reputation for relative peace, Kenya's elections are anything but free and fair. Kenyan women running for parliament are in danger of being raped (Hunt 2007) and Kenyan officials are known to be corrupt and to misappropriate public funds with impunity (Githongo 2008). There is typically violence every time a general election is held, but no prior skirmish had reached the scale of the violence seen in early 2008. Ndungu (2008) reported more than 1500 women rape victims, with cases of gang and sibling raping all occurring during the last election. Osborne (2008) stated that businesses and shops were burnt to the ground and many women and young girls were raped during the violence. The main perpetrators of this violence were individuals who were apparently convinced that only a member of the Kikuyu tribe (one of the major tribes) was capable of leading Kenya.

Documentation of what happened has revealed that the violence was actually planned early in 2007 and that explains the violence that accompanied nominations even before the elections themselves (KCHR 2008). It appears that some people were prepared to start violence once the results were announced, regardless of how they turned out. Through text messages, a huge number of Kenyans had been alerted by their various supporters as to what to do. As the presidential results were being announced, violence erupted in most parts of Kenya.

At some stage it appeared as if no one was in charge especially before the current President was controversially and hurriedly sworn in and a government put in place. Once in place most political leaders

the AUTHOR talked to believe the violence would be short lived and dismissed calls to bring I n the Kenyan Army as had been the case in the 1982 abortive coup. Violence escalated instead of relenting, people were massacred and it had to take the intervention of the international community to bring matters to cool down (UNICEF 2008).

The 2008 political violence severely undermined food security, especially in areas regarded as the grain basket of the country (e.g., the Rift Valley), where a large number of people were displaced at a time when they should have been preparing their land for planting. Violence chased farmers and their families away from their farms and into camps, with the result that more than two thirds of farm land was left uncultivated. Furthermore, fertilizer prices skyrocketed and transportation of government-subsidized fertilizer from the port of Mombasa was delayed, meaning that the relatively small amount of cultivated land was planted without fertilizer (IRINa 2008).

For decades, Kenya has been home to refugees from neighboring countries. In 2008, it had to manage its own "refugees." Catering for the more than half-million internally displaced persons in terms of shelter, food, security and other basic needs has proven to be a daunting challenge.

Appendix 2: Rwanda and Burundi

Rwanda and Burundi are two hilly countries that are extremely beautiful but densely populated. These countries have histories of statehood and hierarchical social structures stretching back 400-700 years. The populations of the two countries are very similar in composition, with the Hutu (Bahutu) comprising a large majority. According to a colonial anthropology of the 19th century (PPU 1994), the Hutu are Bantu people who emigrated from Cameroon and traveled eastward to Kenya and southward to the Cape, populating approximately one-third of Africa's surface. The Hutu, like most Bantu, have their work in agriculture. In contrast, the Tutsi (Batutsi), who according to colonial anthropology came from northeast Africa, are Nilo-Cushitic and mostly work as cattle breeders. It is said that in the pre-colonial days, population groups were always moving in search of food and peace (PPU 1994).

Appendix 2, Map 1. Map of Rwanda and Burundi and surrounding areas.



Source: http://www.reliefweb.int/mapc/afr_east/gl_reg/rwa_bdi.html

PPU(1994) noted that there was tension in Rwanda between 1961 and 1966 as Tutsis living outside the country attempted several times to topple the government of Rwanda. Each time they did this, Hutus inside the country retaliated by massacring the Tutsis living inside Rwanda. By December 1963, 14,000 were dead and tens of thousands of Tutsis had fled the country. In 1966, the policy of "ethnic" discrimination against the Tutsi was pursued in the same manner as an earlier colonial policy directed against the Hutu. The Hutu were hitting back.

Appendix 2, Figure 1. Bones of massacred Tutsis



Source: PPU 1994, London

The military in neighboring Burundi was Tutsi-dominated from 1966 to 1991, with the Hutu majority lacking representation in the military and remaining under-represented in politics. In 1972 a state-organized, selective genocide was carried out by the army against tens of thousands of Hutu and opposition Tutsi. Between 100,000 and 200,000 people are estimated to have died beginning at the end of April 1972. This followed agitation by Hutu extremists among Barundi refugees in Tanzania, and a Hutu rebellion in the south. Within days, educated Hutu *évolués* and Tutsi dissidents had been rounded up and murdered by the army. *Évolué* is a French term (literally, *evolved* or *developed*) used in the colonial era to refer to native Africans who had "evolved" through education or assimilation and accepted European values and patterns of behavior. *Évolués* spoke French, followed French laws, usually held white-collar jobs (although rarely higher than clerks), and lived primarily in urban areas. Such individuals were seen as the desired end product of France's assimilation policy. *Évolués* were treated as an elite and privileged group by the colonial administrators" (Delancey et al. 2000).

Thereafter, the Hutu in Burundi were described as a "lost generation" bound together by their hatred for the Tutsi, who remained in power and discriminated against the Hutu. Until the 1990s, the intellectual and leadership class consisted almost exclusively of Tutsis. Under the eleven-year Bagaza regime (1976-1987), there were no further massacres, but there was also no sharing of power. All provincial governors and most civil servants, judges, and teachers were Tutsi. The same was true in Rwanda, but in this case the Hutus were in power. In 1984, the tension came to a head as the Hutus massacred close to a million Tutsis before the international community stepped in. Fifteen years later, suspects are still in jail awaiting trial while judiciaries seek to close loopholes that would allow them to gain political impunity.

10. REFERENCES

Baro, M., F. Deubel. 2006. Persistent hunger: Perspectives on vulnerability, famine, and food security in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 35(Oct): 521-538.

Benson, T.D. 2008. *Improving nutrition as a development priority: addressing undernutrition within national policy processes in Sub-Saharan Africa*. IFPRI research report # 156. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute.

Birner, R. 2007. *Improving governance to eradicate hunger and poverty*. 2020 Focus Brief on the World's Poor and Hungry People. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute.

Clover, J. 2003. Food security in sub-Saharan Africa. *African Security Review* 12(1): 5.

De Waal, A. and A. Whiteside. 2003. United Nations System Standing Committee on Nutrition Emergency relief in high HIV prevalence area. New variant famine: AIDS and food crisis in southern Africa. *Lancet* 362(9391): 1234-1237.

DeLancey, M.W., and M.D. DeLancey. 2000. *Historical dictionary of the Republic of Cameroon* (3rd ed.). Lanham, Maryland: The Scarecrow Press.

Devineau J.L., A. Aurouet, M. Douame, A. Hladik. 2008. Changes in the availability and uses of wild yams according to climatic dryness and land-cover in Western Burkina Faso (West Africa): a joint ecological and ethno-botanical approach using GIS and remote-sensing. *Biodiversity and Conservation* 17(8): 1937-1963.

DFID. 2005. *Growth and poverty reduction: The role of agriculture*. DFID Policy Paper. London,UK: UK Department for International Development. www.DFID.org

FEWS NET. 2005.*Southern Africa emergency overview*. <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/LSGZ-6HAH9K.> Accessed June 2009.

FEWS NET. 2006. FEWS NET Home: USGS international program. Available online at http://edcintl.cr.usgs.gov/fewsnet.html. Accessed on June 12, 2006.

FEWS NET. 2008. *Hunger season starts early in Karamoja.* Uganda Food Security. Washington, D.C.: USAID.

FEWS NET.2009.*Executive overview of food security.* Washington, D.C.: USAID. <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/MUMA-7UG5J3> Accessed June 2009.

GHA. 2003. Regional overview (GHA)- factors affecting food availability and access. *Food Security Bulletin* 10.2: (March).

Giles, J. 2007. Climate change 2007: How to survive a warming world. *Nature News Feature* 446: 716-717 (12 Apr 2007)

Githongo, J. 2008. Kenya riding the tiger. *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 2(2): 359-367.

GoK. 2007. http://www.kenya-information-guide.com/kenya-population.html

Guest, R. 2004. *The shackled continent: Africa's past, present, and future.* London: PanMacmillan.

Hadley, C. and C.L. Patil. 2006. Food insecurity in rural Tanzania is associated with maternal anxiety and depression. *American Journal of Human Biology* 18: 359-368.

Hadley, C. and C.L. Patil. 2008. Seasonal changes in household food insecurity and symptoms of anxiety and depression. *American Journal of Physical Anthropology* 135:225-232.

Hartung, W.D., B. Moix. 2000. *Deadly legacy: U.S. arms to Africa and the Congo War*. Arms Trade Resource Centre Reports, Weapons of War. New York: World Policy Institute.

Hulme, M.,R. Doherty, T.Ngara, M.New, D. Lister. 2000. *African climate change: 1900-2100*. Climate Research. 12 April 2000. São Paulo, Brazil: Secretaria de Estado do Meio Ambiente, Companhia de Tecnologia de Saneamento Ambiental.

Hunt, S. 2007. Let women rule. *Foreign Affairs* (May/June). Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Affairs.

IFPRI/FAO. 2008. Impact of Climate Change and Bio-energy on Nutrition.Reasearch Report. 36-38. Washington, D.C. and Rome: International Food Policy Research Institute and FAO.

IFRC (International Federation of the Red Crescent and Societies). 2002. *Disaster management: Floods in Southern Africa*. Geneva, Switzeland

IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority in Development). 2002. Disaster risk Management Programme in the IGAD Region . http://www.unisdr.org/africa/af-partners/partners-af-drr.htm Accessed June 2009.

ICG. 2007. *Darfur's new security reality.* Africa Report No. 13426, November 2007. Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group.

IPCC. 2000. Impact of Climate Change on Life in Africa. Climate Research Special Report. 17: 145-168. Venice, Italy.

IPU. (Inter-Parliamentary Union). 2006 The role of Parliament in strengthening control of Trafficking in small arms and light weapons and their Ammunition. Resolution Adopted by Consensus. Nairobi: IPU.

IPU (Inter-Parliamentary Union). 2006. 114th Assembly (May 12 2006). Nairobi: IPU.

IRIN Africa. 2008. Humanitarian news and analysis. South Sudan case study: Northern Bahr el Ghazal. New York: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. http://www.reliefweb.int/ Accessed June 2009.

IRIN/UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 2008. *Displaced women still facing threat of sexual violence*. Humanitarian News and analysis: Kenya. Nairobi: IRIN.

IRINa. 2008. *Humanitarian country profiles background, Humanitarian news and analysis* (March). UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Nairobi: United Nations.

IRINb. 2008. Country Profile, Kenya. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Nairobi: United Nations.

Kenya Commission on Human Rights (KCHR). 2008. Post Election Violence Report 2008, Nairobi, Kenya.

Kenya Red Cross. 2007. Humanitarian Disasters in the Horn of Africa. Nairobi, Kenya.

Khabuchi, L. 2008. Why African Governments Should Stop Paying Lip Service to Food Crisis. Kenya Times, June 23. Nairobi, Kenya.

Kingma, K. 1997. Demobilization of combatants after civil wars in Africa and their reintegration into civilian life. *Policy Sciences* 30: 151-165.

Kirwan, B.E. and M. McMillan. 2007. Food aid and poverty. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics* December: 4.

Luckham, R., I. Ahmed, R. Mugah, and S. White. 2001. *Conflict and poverty in sub-Saharan Africa: An assessment of the issues and evidence.* Working paper #128. Brighton, England: Institute of Development Studies.

Lynch, C. 2004. U.N. says its workers abuse women in Congo: Report laments a 'significant' incidence of pedophilia, prostitution and rape. *Washington Post,* November 27: A27.

Mundt, R.J. 1990. Gun control and rates of firearms violence in Canada and the United States. *Canadian Journal of Criminology*, 35.

Ndungu, N. 2008. Witness statements. Proceedings of the United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health, February 6.Washington, D.C..

Nyong'o, P.A 1993 *Arms and daggers in the heart of Africa: Studies on internal conflicts*. Nairobi: Academy Science Publishers.

OCHA. 2005a. Humanitarian strategic framework for southern Africa 2005. Paper prepared by UN agencies and NGO partners, Regional Hunger and Vulnerability Programme Scoping Study. Johannesburg. UN Regional Inter Agency Co-ordination Support Office (RIASCO).

OCHA. 2005b. Regional Support Office for Central and East Africa. Report of the Scenario Development and Humanitarian Analysis Workshop for Countries of the Horn of Africa, November.

Omosa, M. and D. McCormick. 2004. *Universal access to communication services in rural Kenya: A baseline survey*. Final report to the Communication Commission of Kenya and International Development Research Centre. Institute for Development Studies. Nairobi: University of Nairobi.

Oxfam. 2006. Causing hunger: An overview of the food crisis in Africa. London: Oxfam.

Peace Pledge Union (PPU). 1994. 1 *Peace passage*. London: PPU http://www.ppu.org.uk/genocide/g_rwanda1.html Accessed June 2009.

Sacks, D. 2009. *Halting hunger: Long-term solutions to systemic problems in African agriculture.* Policy Comment No. 26. Mercatus Policy Center Series. Arlington, VA: George Mason University.

SADC. 2005. Workshop on the External Review of Vulnerability Assessment Committee in the SADC Region Methodology. Regional Vulnerability Assessment Committee, Record of Proceedings, 19 September 2005.

Scherrer, C.P. 2002. *Genocide and crisis in central Africa: Conflict roots, mass violence, and regional war.* London: Praeger of Greenwood Publishing Group.

Tadesse, M. 2003. *Turning conflict to co-operation in the Horn of Africa.* Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: FES International Publications/ Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

TCCR.2009.Adapting to climate change. London UK.

The Economist. 2007. Is Kenya getting better or worse? Jun 7th, UK version.

Thomas, T. 2004. Reviewing Africa's tribes and borders. *Contemporary Review* 285(1663): 79-82.

Tibbo, K. and D. Scott. 2006 Chronic vulnerability to food insecurity: An overview from Southern Africa. *Humanitarian Exchange Magazine* 33.

Twaddle M. and J. Currey. 1993. *Kakungulu and the creation of Uganda*. Nairobi: East African Education Publishers .

Ulrich, H., W. Wiseman and T. Robertson. 2006. *Integrated risk financing to protect livelihoods and foster development.* Discussion Paper. Rome: World Food Program.

UN Population Fund (UNFPA). 2003. *Country programme document for Kenya.* New York: United Nations Population Fund.

UN/Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. 2001. *Militarism and HIV/AIDS: The deadly consequences for women.* UN General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS, June 2001, New York.

UNICEF 2008. *Post-election violence situation report* 29: February 26. Kenya: UNICEF.

UNSa. 2008. *UN food aid agency appeals for $500 million to offset soaring prices.* 24 Mar, http://www.reliefweb.int/. Accessed June 2009.

Urbach, J. and D. Sacks. 2009. *Fixing famine: How technology and incentives can help feed Africa*. Policy Comment No. 25, Mercatus Center Policy Series. Arlington, VA: George Mason University, 2009.

von Grebmer K., H. Fritschel B. Nestorova, T. Olofinbiyi, R. Pandya-Lorch, and Y. Yohannes. 2008. *The challenge of hunger.* The 2008 Global Hunger Index--Issue Brief No. 54. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute.

Wacha, J. 2008. Northern Uganda awaits final peace as northern Ugandans wait for a historic peace deal to be signed; many are looking forward to a period of recovery and regret. *Northern Uganda* 162: March 26, 2008.

RECENT IFPRI DISCUSSION PAPERS

For earlier discussion papers, please go to www.ifpri.org/pubs/pubs.htm#dp.
All discussion papers can be downloaded free of charge.

908. *Assessing the economic viability of alternative water resources in water-scarce regions: Combining economic valuation, cost-benefit analysis and discounting.* Ekin Birol, Phoebe Koundouri, and Yiannis Kountouris, 2009.

907. *Green and blue water accounting in the Limpopo and Nile Basins: Implications for food and agricultural policy.* Timothy B. Sulser, Claudia Ringler, Tingju Zhu, Siwa Msangi, Elizabeth Bryan, and Mark W. Rosegrant, 2009.

906. *The growth-poverty convergence agenda: Optimizing social expenditures to maximize their impact on agricultural labor productivity, growth, and poverty reduction in Africa.* Ousmane Badiane and John Ulimwengu, 2009.

905. *HIV and mobility in the Lake Victoria Basin agricultural sector: A literature review.* Scott Drimie, Julia Weinand, Stuart Gillespie, and Margaret Wagah, 2009.

904. *Institutional change, rural services, and agricultural performance in Kyrgyzstan.* Kamiljon T. Akramov and Nurbek Omuraliev, 2009.

903. *A picture of tariff protection across the world in 2004: MAcMap-HS6, version 2.* Houssein Boumellassa, David Laborde Debucquet, and Cristina Mitaritonna, 2009.

902. Governance decentralization and local infrastructure provision in Indonesia, Shyamal Chowdhury, Futoshi Yamauchi, and Reno Dewina, 2009.

901. *Estimating the impact of agricultural technology on poverty reduction in rural Nigeria*. Babatunde Omilola, 2009.

900. *Greenhouse gas mitigation: Issues for India agriculture*. Gerald Nelson, Richard Robertson, Siwa Msangi, Tingju Zhu, Xiaoli Liao, Puja Jawajar, 2009.

899. *Rural non-farm income and inequality in Nigeria*. Babatunde Omilola, 2009.

898. *Lagging regions and development strategies: The case of Peru.* James Thurlow, Samuel Morley, and Alejandro Nin Pratt, 2009.

897. *Spatial networks, labor supply, and income dynamics: Evidence from Indonesian villages*. Futoshi Yamauchi, Megumi Muto, Shyamal Chowdhury, Reno Dewina, and Sony Sumaryanto, 2009.

896. *The evolution of an industrial cluster in China.* Belton Fleisher, Dinghuan Hu, William McGuire, and Xiaobo Zhang, 2009.

895. *Commodity price volatility and nutrition vulnerability.* Monika Verma and Thomas W. Hertel, 2009

894. *Measuring irrigation performance in Africa*. Mark Svendsen, Mandy Ewing, and Siwa Msangi, 2009

893. *Managing future oil revenues in Ghana: An assessment of alternative allocation options.* Clemens Breisinger, Xinshen Diao**,** Rainer Schweickert**,** and Manfred Wiebelt, 2009.

892. *Impact of water user associations on agricultural productivity in Chile.* Nancy McCarthy and Tim Essam, 2009.

891. *China's growth and the agricultural exports of southern Africa.* Nelson Villoria, Thomas Hertel, and Alejandro Nin-Pratt, 2009.

890. *The impact of climate variability and change on economic growth and poverty in Zambia.* James Thurlow, Tingju Zhu, and Xinshen Diao, 2009.

889. *Navigating the perfect storm: Reflections on the food, energy, and financial crises.* Derek Headey, Sangeetha Malaiyandi, and Shenggen Fan, 2009.

888. *How important is a regional free trade area for southern Africa? Potential impacts and structural constraints.* Alejandro Nin Pratt, Xinshen Diao, and Yonas Bahta, 2009.

887. *Determinant of smallholder farmer labor allocation decisions in Uganda.* Fred Bagamba, Kees Burger, and Arie Kuyvenhoven, 2009.

886. *The potential cost of a failed Doha Round.* Antoine Bouët and David Laborde, 2009.

INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

www.ifpri.org

IFPRI HEADQUARTERS

2033 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006-1002 USA
Tel.: +1-202-862-5600
Fax: +1-202-467-4439
Email: ifpri@cgiar.org

IFPRI ADDIS ABABA

P. O. Box 5689
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Tel.: +251 11 6463215
Fax: +251 11 6462927
Email: ifpri-addisababa@cgiar.org

IFPRI NEW DELHI

CG Block, NASC Complex, PUSA
New Delhi 110-012 India
Tel.: 91 11 2584-6565
Fax: 91 11 2584-8008 / 2584-6572
Email: ifpri-newdelhi@cgiar.org